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I. INTRODUCTION
In Soviet times, the Soviet judiciary was the least respected branch
of the legal profession. Judges did not render judicial decisions until
they cleared the result with the local Communist party boss or some
other ranking apparachtik.Among the general Soviet population, this

* LL.M. Georgetown University (1991); J.D. Syracuse University (1985);

B.A. Franklin & Marshall College (1982). The author is Director of Russian
Criminal Law Reform Programs at the American Bar Association-Central and East
European Law Initiative (ABA-CEELI). From 1993 to 1995, he lived and worked
in Russia and is a frequent traveler and observer of court proceedings there. Since
1995, Mr. Boylan has directed a program that focuses on reforming the Russian
judiciary. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
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process was known as "telephone justice," and the judges who dispensed it were held in low esteem.
The Soviet legacy has made it difficult to establish an independent
and respected judiciary in Russia. 2 Much of the former structure that
enabled the Soviet government to control judge's decisions still exists, and Russians remain very suspicious of the judiciary. Despite
the significant barriers to the creation of an independent judiciary,
positive steps have recently been taken. Unfortunately, most of the
judicial reforms-like the on-again, off-again privatization efforts in
Russia-are incomplete, partial, and inconsistent. Although Russia is
in the process of creating a rule-of-law state, significant problems
remain for criminal defendants-especially for non-Russians. 3 Nevertheless, progress has been made over the past year leading to some
optimism about the future development of the Russian judiciary.

II. WHAT IS AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY?
While there is no single definition of what characterizes an independent judiciary, it is generally agreed that an independent judiciary
is indispensable to a viable and functioning constitutional democracy. 4 There are standards, however, that are useful in evaluating a
judicial system and the extent of its independence. 5 First, judicial
leadership is essential in the creation and establishment of an independent judiciary. 6 Second, the judiciary should function as a separate government branch that is equal in standing and status to the
other government branches.7 The judiciary should, therefore, not

1. See Mark S. Ellis, Getting Judges to Hang Up on 'Telephone Justice,'

WASH. POST, June 22, 1997, at C3.
2. See GORDON B. SMITH, REFORMING THE RUSSIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 129

(1996).
3. See Mumin Shakirov, Judge Is Accuser, Arbiter, Moscow TIMES, Apr. 3,
1998, § 1426.
4. See James G. Apple, The Role of JudicialIndependence and Judicial Leadership in the Protection of Human Rights, in THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE

PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 197, 199 (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif
eds., 1997).
5. See Recommendation No. R (94) 12, Council of Eur. Comm. of Ministers to
Member States on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges. (Oct. 13,
1994) [hereinafter Recommendation No. R (94) 121.
6. See Apple, supra note 4, at 201-02.
7. See id. at 208.
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simply be a part of the Ministry or Department of Justice. "' As a separate entity, the judiciary should prepare and submit the budget for the
judicial branch. 9 Third, judges should be appointed for life and their
salaries should never be reduced. 10 At a minimum, the law should
guarantee the term of office for a judge. 1 Judges' salaries should be
sufficient and appropriate, relative to their rank and the salaries of
other public officials in the nation they serve.12 Judges should also
have an adequate staff
and should have ultimate control over court
3
facilities.'
and
space
Fourth, an independent judiciary is self-policing.' 4 Judges should
discipline other judges. 15 The judiciary should enact and enforce
codes of conduct that prohibit political activity by sitting judges.'
Judges should only be subject to removal for high crimes and misdemeanors, and only by impeachment.' 7 Judges should have the
power of review and supervision over the day-to-day operations of
the courts 18 and should maintain a conference to administer the
courts and the education of judges.' 9 Finally, elected officials must
respect the courts and their decisions. Most importantly, the officials
who run the government must be willing to uphold the decisions of
their nation's courts, even when they disagree with the decision.
There have been, as discussed below, significant, albeit piecemeal,
judicial reforms recently undertaken in Russia. These recent reforms
tend to be positive and hopefully foreshadow further reforms that
will increase judicial independence and the rule-of-law in Russia. It
must be emphasized, however, that the recent progress
is far from
2)
necessary.
are
reforms
additional
complete-many

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
judges

See id. at 208-09.
See id. at 212-13.
See id. at 209-10.
See Reconnendation No. R (94) 12, supra note 5.
See Apple, supra note 4. at 211.
See id. at 211, 215.
See id. at 211-12.
See id.
See id. at 215-16.
See Apple, supra note 4. at 210-11.
See id. at 212.
See id.
See Shakirov, supra note 3. § 1426 (discussing the continuing practice of
who simultaneously act as public prosecutors and chief arbitrators in viola-

1330

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[13:1327

III. COMPARISON OF THE INQUISITORIAL AND
ADVERSARIAL SYSTEMS
The current Russian judicial system is based on European continental civil law, or the inquisitorial system. The Soviet criminal
justice system had its roots in the inquisitorial system. 22 In addition,
the Russian judicial system still contains authoritarian aspects from
its Soviet and Imperialist past. Whether under the Bolivars or Bolsheviks, the Russian courts have always been part of a repressive
system. 23 In the inquisitorial system, as distinguished from the adversarial practice employed in the United States, the judge assumes the
primary role as the weigher of evidence and determines the truth and
veracity of testimony. 24 A trial under the inquisitorial system that
predominates criminal trials in Russia today,
may be considered an authoritarian and paternalistic process dominated by
an official. It is centered on the pervasive power of the judge to conduct a
hierarchically organized search for the truth. The accused find themselves
in the position of subordinates
whose possibilities of defense are severely
25
restricted by official control.

Although Russian prosecution and defense attorneys pose questions
to witnesses, their roles are much more passive than in an adversarial
system.26
The equality of the defense and prosecution, in their ability to enter
and proffer evidence during a trial, distinguishes the adversarial systion of Article 123 of the Russian Constitution, yet in compliance with Article 35 of

the Criminal Procedure Code).
21. See Joachim Herrmann, Models for the Reform of the Criminal Trial in
East and Southeast European Countries: Comparative Remarks from a German
Perspective, in THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN
LAW INITIATIVE, ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE FOR THE

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, app. C, at 2 (1996).
22. See id.
23. See Marshall Ingwerson, Russia's Juries Give Police an O.J.-Style Rap,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 23, 1996, at 1 (stating that there are no juries in
most Russian courts and that the judges consider any evidence that is presented).
24. See JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIvIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA

127 (2d ed. 1985).

25. Id.
26. See Herrmann, supra note 21, at 2.
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tem from the inquisitorial system. 27 In an adversarial proceeding, the
judge is relatively passive. 28 The adversarial system is also considered more democratic and supportive of a civil society. ' 9 In Russia,
the prosecutor frequently does not attend trials and the judge acts as
both prosecutor and judge. 30 This practice, from Soviet times, severely contradicts the Russian Constitution that states
that the prose31
cution and defense should be on an equal footing.
Over the past century there "has been a steady movement on the
European continent from the inquisitorial to the adversarial trial. 32
Many European nations have reformed their criminal justice systems
and are now more adversarial in nature. 33 The Czech Republic, perceived by many to be at the forefront of democratic reform among
the former Communist nations, has worked to introduce the adversarial system into its criminal justice system. Moving away from the
inquisitorial system is a means by which the Czechs have attempted
to distance themselves and their legal system from Soviet/Russian
domination. 34
While the Russian system has adopted the jury trial, a hallmark of
the adversarial system, jury trials are conducted in only a small fraction of the criminal cases in Russia. By adopting a limited jury trial
system, the Russians have injected an element of the adversarial sys27. See MERRYMAN, supra note 24, at 129.

28. See id.
29. See Herrmann, supra note 21, at 3 (noting that the adversarial system "'evidences democratic values not only because the case may be decided by a jury but
also because two principally equal parties enter into competition before the
judge").

30. See Shakirov, supra note 3, § 1426.
31. See id.
32. Herrmann, supra note 21, at 3.
33. See Avv. Giuseppe Bianchi, How Aspects of the Adversarial System Are
Incorporatedin the InquisitorialSystem Under the Old and New Italian Criminal
Procedure Code, in THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CEN'RMAL AND E.AST
EUROPEAN LAW INITIATIVE, ANALYSIS OF THE DRAFT CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE

FOR THE RussiAN

FEDERATION, app. B, at 2 (an analysis is available from ABACEELI, 740 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005) (noting that Italy adopted
adversarial procedures as part of its anti-corruption reforms in the early part of this
decade). Spain has also begun an experiment with the jury trial. See id. at 2-3.
34. The author was country director for the American Bar Association Central
and East European Law Initiative's Rule of Law program in the Czech Republic
and actively assisted in reforming the Czech criminal justice system during 1995
and 1996.
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tern into what has been an inquisitorial system for over seventy years.
The Russian system, however, remains predominantly inquisitorial
and authoritarian in nature.
A jury trial in Russia resembles a jury trial in the United States,
except for noticeable differences that stem from the fact that the
judges, lawyers, and prosecutors have been indoctrinated in the inquisitorial system of practice. Russian jury trials suffer from the same
problems that they did in Czarist times, and defense attorneys are still
hampered by the inquisitorial aspects that remain. For example, the
Russian defense attorney still has little opportunity for involvement
in the pre-trial investigation and, therefore, the system places more5
emphasis on closing arguments to the jury than in the United States.3

IV. RUSSIAN JUDICIAL REFORMS
A. LIFETIME APPOINTMENT
Russia is currently in the process of granting lifetime appointments
to its judges. 36 Judges in regional trial courts are initially appointed
for a five-year term and then are re-appointed for life. 37 Eventually,
all of the judges on the courts of general jurisdiction will be appointed for life and will experience a corresponding increase in independence. Judges in the separate commercial courts, or Arbitrazi
courts, 38 are also receiving lifetime tenure. 39 Members of the Con-

35. See Girish N. Bhat, The Moralization of Guilt in Late Imperial Russian
Trial by Jury: The Early Reform Era, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 77, 93-94 (1997).
36. See KONST. RF(1993) art. 121.

37. See Zakon RF o statuse sudei v RF, Vedomosti Fed. Sobr. RF, 1992, No. 9.
Item No. 223, art. 11(3) [hereinafter Law on the Status of Judges]. Law students
and young lawyers in Russia, like their colleagues in most of Europe. decide early
in their legal careers to pursue a judicial career path. They usually gain experience
by working as staff lawyers for courts. The Russian Constitution only requires that
judges have five years of legal experience, possess a law degree, and have attained
the age of twenty-five. See KONST. RF (1993) art. 119.
38. See Glenn P. Hendrix, Business Litigation and Arbitration in Russia, 31

INT'L LAW. 1075, 1084-1100 (1997) (providing an overview of how Arbitrazh
courts function).
39. See Zakon ob arbitrazhnom [Arbitrazh Court Act] Vedomostiizmenenii I
dopolnenii v zakon RSFSR, Ob arbitrazhom sude [Amendment to the RF Arbitrazh
Court Act], Vedmosti Fed. Sobr. RF, 1992, No. 34, Item No. 1965, art. 20., cited in
id. at 1084-1100.
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stitutional Court are appointed for twelve-year terms, 4" and judges on
the Supreme Court and Supreme Arbitration (Commercial) Court are
appointed to life terms.41
Despite this new appointment process, there have not been any
purges nor anything resembling a purge in the bureaucracies of Russia, including the ranks of the Russian judiciary. Most Russian bureaucrats, including judges, occupied their same or similar positions
when the Soviet Union was intact and the Communist Party reigned
supreme. The 1993 Russian Constitution states that "Justices are independent and are subordinate only to the Constitution of the Russian
Federation and to federal law.'' 42 However, the concept of judicial
independence is new in Russia and is only now beginning to develop.
As of the writing of this essay, only about twenty percent of Russian judges were appointed for life.4 3 The rest are serving out a variety of terms with the hope of a future lifetime appointment. Therefore, the vast majority of the Russian bench is still subject to subtle
and not so subtle influence from both government officials and the
politically powerful who may have a say in whether or not a judge is
re-appointed to the bench for life. This flaw will eventually be cured
as more judges receive lifetime appointments.
The current situation in Russia is actually more analogous to the
current situation in the United States. In the United States, federal
judges are appointed for life and are correspondingly viewed as the
most independent. In the special federal courts, such as the United
States Court of Federal Claims and the United States Tax Court,
judges are appointed for fifteen-year terms. Practitioners in these
courts complain that judges who are nearing the end of a term and are
seeking re-appointment44 are usually much more sympathetic to the
government's position.
40. See Sergei Pashin, New Opportunities for Development of Russia's Judicial
System, CONST. L. E. EUR. REv. 1, 4 (1997).
41. See Law on the Status of Judges, supra note 37. art. 11.
42. KONST. RF (1993) § I, ch. 7, art. 120.

43. See Pashin, supra note 40, at 19 (stating that judges in courts of general jurisdiction had varying terms of office).
44. See Deborah A. Geier, The Tal Court, Article Ill, and the Proposal Advanced by the Federal Courts Study Comnittee: A Study in Applied Constitutional

Theory, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 985, 997-99. 1016-17 (1991); cf David Laro, The
Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribunal. 1995 U. ILL L. REV. 17,
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The bulk of the United States judiciary sits in the state courts.
State court judges in the United States are selected by different methods depending upon the state, ranging from appointment, to appointment with retention elections, to direct election. Assuming that
the reform process continues, all Russian judges will eventually be
appointed for life. Upon the completion of this reform process, Russians will be able to make a very good argument that their judiciary,
as a whole, is more independent than the judiciary in the United
States.
B. INDEPENDENT AND ADEQUATE BUDGET

During the Soviet era, the Ministry of Justice administered the
budget for the court system. The Russian system has always considered judges part of the executive branch. 45 When the democratic reforms began in Russia, many reformers claimed that the courts
should maintain their own budget and should not be beholden to the
executive branch for financing judicial operations and paying the
judges' salaries.
A major proponent of an independent budget for the court system
is Vyacheslav Lebedev, Chief Justice of the Russian Supreme Court.
The new Law on the Judiciary, 46 enacted in early 1997, took steps in
this direction. The law establishes an independent and selfadministering budget for the Russian Supreme Court. However, the
remaining bulk of Russian courts are subject to financial budgeting
and assistance from executive agencies in Moscow and in the regions. Therefore, the courts are still subject to influence from the
central and local governments.
An independent and self-administered budget is imperative if Russia is to advance judicial reform. Some argue that viable democracies
24-25 (1995) (analyzing the appointment process of judges to the United States
Tax Court and the alleged bias these judges exhibit toward the government).
45. See BARTON L. INGRAHAM, THE STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
LAWS AND PRACTICE OF FRANCE, THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND THE UNITED

STATES 5 (1987) (stating that courts in the Soviet Union are administrative agencies of the central government).
46. See Federal Constitutional Law No. 1-FKZ of Dec. 31, 1996 on the Judicial
System of the Russian Federation, GARANT Database (1997) <http://
www.securities.com/cgi-bin/.. .judicial)+and+(system)+and+(1-FKZ)> [hereinafter
Law on the Judicial System].
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in Western Europe administer court budgets through the Ministry of
Justice and the Russian system is, therefore, consistent with practices
in France and Germany. These arguments, however, ignore history.
In France and Germany, the courts are respected by the general public and maintain a history and tradition of independence. In contrast,
the courts in Russia have a history of government and party control
and enjoy little respect from the general population.
In order to break from its history, Russia must go beyond copying
what is done in other countries and take steps to demonstrate that its
courts are truly independent and free from overt influence from the
government. For this reason, it is imperative that the independent
budgetary authority, now enjoyed by the Russian Supreme Court, be
extended to the entire court system.
Comparisons of the sizes of judicial budgets and salaries in different countries can be misleading and distorting. Nevertheless, it is undisputed that the courts in Russia are severely under-financed. 4 7 This
condition is detrimental to the creation of a viable rule-of-law state in
Russia. 48 For example, a Russian judge makes a little over 500 dolStates District Court judge is
lars a month.4 9 In contrast, a United
s
year.
a
dollars
133,000
over
paid
Russian court facilities are uniformly poor and fail to create the
sense of awe that courts of justice in the United States tend to inspire.
United States courts are built to reflect the idea that the rule-of-law is
supreme. The "rule-of-law architecture" in Russia is in need of reform. By enhancing the physical condition of Russian court buildings, reformers will demonstrate to all Russians that the law is central to the new Russia.
47. See NATIONS IN TRANSIT: CivI. SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY .AND MARKETS IN
EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES 321 (Adrian
Karatnycy et al. eds., 1997) (stating that "the independence of the judiciary is

threatened by chronic underfunding and by its subordinate position").
48. See id. Underfunding makes the judiciary more susceptible to corruption,
obstructs the efficiency of the judicial system, and constrains judicial growth. See
id.
49. Russian judges make an average of two million rubles (USS 3751 per
month. See Bronwyn McLaren, Beleagured Judges Get 65 Percent Pay Raise,
Moscow TlIvs, July 30, 1997, § 1260. With the pay raise. Russian judges make
an average of US$ 533 per month. See id.
50. See Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 1996 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary (visited May 20, 1998) <http://wwwv.uscourts.gov/cj96.htm>.
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C. COURT BAILIFFS: SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

Two primary concerns of Russian judges are security and the enforcement of court orders. Recently passed legislation created a new
system of court bailiffs to provide security for courts and judges and
to enforce judgments. 5' The Russian bailiffs system was modeled
after the United States Marshals system, with some notable exceptions.
In 1997, in addition to the bailiffs law, a companion law on the enforcement of judgments was also enacted. 52 Under this new law,
bailiffs will receive a percentage of the judgments they collect. This
"bounty" type system could lead Russian bailiffs to ignore procedural
safeguards in order to satisfy their own financial interests. However,
because the government's budget is severely constricted, the drafters'
reasons for creating a partially self-financing system of enforcing
judgments is clear. While the potential for abuse is significant and
individuals have expressed concern, 53 the new bailiffs should be
given a chance to perform before the bounty system is criticized.
D. RESPECT FOR THE JUDICIARY BY OTHER BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT

The judiciary in the United States relies on the good faith of the
executive and legislative branches of government to enforce the decisions of the courts. In Russia, however, elected members of parliament, as well as executive officials and local political leaders, have
frequently been unwilling to abide by the decisions of Russian courts.
A recent example involves the issuance of residency permits.
During the Soviet era, permits were required in order to live in certain areas or certain cities, a practice known as the "pass system."
This was one of the fundamental human rights violations of the Soviet authorities, and it was quickly prohibited by the Russian Constitution of 1993. Today, however, Yuri Luzhkov, the Mayor of Moscow, stubbornly attempts to preserve the pass system to prevent
51. See Russian Federal Law No. 118-FZ of July 21, 1997 on the Officers of
Justice, GARANT Database 11801340 (Bailiff's or Marshall's Law).
52. See Russian Federal Law No. 119-FZ of July 21, 1997 on the Executive
Procedure, GARANT Database 11801339 (Law on Enforcement of Judgments).
53. See Ethan S. Burger, New Legislation on Enforcement of Judicial and Arbitral Decisions in Russia, Russ. Bus. WATCH 23, 26 (1997).
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people from moving to the capital city, in spite of repeated rulings by
the Constitutional Court of Russia declaring the pass system unconstitutional.54 This is but one example of the lack of respect Russian
officials have exhibited for the rulings of Russian courts and correspondingly, the rule-of-law in Russia. 55 If Russia is ever to create a
true democracy, this attitude must change. The burden rests with the
Russian voter. Voters must convey to their elected representatives
that government officials must acquiesce in the face of clear judicial
rulings and be guided in all of their activities by the rules laid out in
the new Russian Constitution.

E. THE JURY TRIAL
One of the early reforms of the Russian judicial system was the
reintroduction of the jury trial. Legislation was initially passed on an
experimental basis. Nine of the eighty-nine regions in Russia were
given the right to hold jury trials.56 Soon after this experiment was
implemented, the new Russian Constitution was drafted to include
the right to a jury trial with the requirement57that the Russian parliament implement legislation for the jury trial.

54. See David Hoffman, Moscow Mayor Defies Court on Residence Rights,
WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1998, at A19.
For the second time in two years, Russia's Constitutional Court has upheld the right to
freedom of movement, which was denied during the totalitanan Soviet era. But the
powerful mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, has refused to compl% , lth
the ruling of
Russia's highest court. The notorious propiska, or residence permit, governed %%here a
person could live, and in Soviet times, it was the pur, iets of the Communist Part, to
tell people where to work and reside. Dissident writers were banishtd to the provinces
as punishment; permits to live in Moscow-always the most desirable-were strictly
controlled.

Id.
55. See id. (quoting Diederik Lohman, Moscow Director for Human Rights
Watch). "Luzhkov doesn't seem to consider himself bound by the rulings of the
highest court in the country, which obviously doesn't do very much for promoting
the rule of law, the separation of powers, and democracy." Id.
56. See David Hoffman, Russia Slowly Reviving the Jur Svstem, S.F. CHRON.,

Nov. 18, 1995, at A12.
57. See KONST. RF (1993) § I, ch. 2, art. 123(4) ("Anyone charged sith a crime

has the right to have his or her case reviewed by a court of lass with the participation of jurors in cases stipulated by the federal law."): Russia Lawless, ECONOMIST,
Apr. 19, 1997, at 52 (reporting that when Yeltsin was facing a rebellious parliament in 1993, a law was approved for jury trials to begin in nine regions);
Hoffman, supra note 56, at A12: see also KONST. RF (1993) § 11.
art. 47.
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Today, despite this legislative effort, jury trials are only held in the
nine regions that participated in the experiment. Implementing legislation to expand the system to twelve additional regions has been
stalled in the Russian Duma. 58 Critics argue that the jury system is
too expensive for an already overtaxed budget. Resistance to the jury
system and its democratizating effect is apparent from Communists
controlling the Lower House of the Russian Parliament. It was the
Bolsheviks, after all, who abandoned jury trials soon after seizing
power at the end of the Russian Revolution. Communists and various
anti-democratic factions and groups in the Russian Parliament inherently distrust the jury system.
In June of 1997, a roundtable discussion in Minsk addressed the
adoption of the jury trial in Belarus. A dictator, who was formerly a
collective farm manager, currently controls Belarus-one of, if not
the most, repressive regimes in the former Soviet Union. Surprisingly, high level Belarusian officials at the roundtable discussion
were interested in discussing the adoption of the jury trial. In fact, the
Belarusian Constitution calls for the adoption of the jury trial. 59 The
dictatorial government of Belarus, however, frequently ignores the
rules of its Constitution.
During the course of the discussion, the Chief Justice of the Belarusian Supreme Court expressed his opposition to the jury trial. He
related the story of an old Czarist era trial in which a jury acquitted a
man who was charged with murdering a Russian noble.60 The noble
had raped the gunman's girlfriend and the Czarist prosecutors and
police were unwilling to charge the noble. The gunman turned to
self-help and shot the noble. The Chief Justice argued that this example clearly demonstrated why the jury trial should not be adopted.
Czarist juries were, in fact, known for their leniency and had a conviction rate that was below their English and European contempo6
raries. 1

58. The Duma is the lower house of the Russian Parliament.
59. See BELARUS CONST., ch. 6, art. 114 ("In accordance with the law, a jury
considers certain categories of cases.").
60. See Chief Justice V. Sukhala, Remarks at the Minsk Roundtable Discussion
(June 1997) (discussing the case of Verazasulich).
61. See Bhat, supra note 35, at 82-83.
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At times, jury nullification has been a problem in the United
States, but the idea of a collective view of justice by a group of ordinary citizens injects democratic vitality into the legal system. Indeed,
there is historical precedent for Russian juries to make law through
moralizing. 62 When the Czar introduced the jury trial into the inquisitorial system, there were some unexpected results. Juries began
making moral decisions that were technically outside the law, but
were perceived as just by the members of the jury. The likelihood
of moralizing by juries is especially great for today's Russian legal
system due to Russia's long history of repression. Additionally, the
Russian judiciary faces a skeptical public as a result of this repression.
Most cases in Russia, however, are tried before a panel of judges,
not a jury. Prior to recent reforms, criminal cases would be tried before a professional judge and two lay assessors. In Soviet days, the
lay assessors were notoriously regarded as tools of the regime. They
came to be known by the derogatory term "nodders. ' ' 4 This nickname arose from their obvious intention to agree with whatever the
judge said. However, not all lay assessors were nodders; some acted
independently. Nevertheless, the general reputation remains, and
nodders are no longer employed in criminal cases. Instead, a panel of
three professional judges sits in criminal cases--one judge presides
and the other two judges ask questions and vote on a verdict. Two
out of the three can convict, and the dissenter may write an opinion
stating the reasons for disagreeing with the majority.
F. APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION BY THE COURTS

During the Soviet Era, the Constitution was not a living document.
Although the Soviet Constitution provided guarantees for a myriad of
rights, in practice, few of these rights were ever enforced, and the
Soviet courts rarely invalidated government action based upon constitutionality. The Soviet system was an authoritarian dictatorship
where the rule-of-law did not prevail. Laws, rules, and sentences to
labor camps could all be changed at the whim of a Communist official. The Soviets "could twist the law anyway they liked. When your
62. See id. at 79-8 1.
63. See id. at 78-79.
64. See ROBERT RAND,

COMRADE LAWYER 3-4.41-42 (1991).
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ten years were up they could say good, have
another ten. Or pack you
65
off to some godforsaken place of exile."
This Soviet history of paper rights that were never enforced led to
one of the most significant developments in current Russian legal reform: trial courts are now applying the Russian Constitution to their
cases. 66 In a recent case, a foreigner objected to paying a higher room
rate based solely upon her status as a foreigner. In Russia, different
prices for foreigners and Russians for hotels, trains, airplane tickets,
and museum admissions are still common. The prices charged to
Russians are much lower. This practice is a holdover from Soviet
days when it was used as a method to gouge hard currency from visiting tourists and Western businessmen. In this recent case, the foreign plaintiff sued a Russian hotel in Yekaterinburg based upon the
Equal Protection Clause of the Russian Constitution. 67 The Court
awarded her damages amounting to the difference between the Russian and foreigner room rate. "Moral damages," similar to punitive
damages in the United States, were also awarded.6 8
In an even more significant case, a Russian judge challenged conventional thought on the constitutionality of a fundamental procedure
of Russian criminal law. 69 The judge declared that the practice of allowing prosecutors to appeal acquittals in Russia violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Russian Constitution. In Russia, it is not tincommon for prosecutors to repeatedly appeal acquittals in an effort to
have repeated chances for a conviction. Under this system, it can take
years before a case is finally concluded, with the defendant stagnat65.

ALEXANDER SOLZHEN1TSYN, ONE DAY IN THE LIFE OF IVAN DENISOVICH

60-61 (1995).
66. Beginning on January 1, 1997, Russian judges were authorized to apply the
Constitution to matters before them. See Law on the Judicial System, supra note

46.
67. See Chloe Arnold, Court Bans Gouging of Foreigners,Moscow TIMES, §
1439 (noting that "Article 426.2 of the [Russian] Civil Code ... states that prices

of goods and services should be the same for all consumers, regardless of their nationality"); KONST. RF (1993) § 1, ch. 2, art. 19(1) ("All people shall be equal before the law and in the court of law.").
68. See Arnold, supra note 67, § 1439.
69. See Judge N. Sneigerova, Moscow City Court, Presentation at DOJ/CEELI
Criminal Law Reform Workshop, City Court, Saint Petersburg, Russia (Jan. 29-3 I,
1998) [hereinafter Presentation of Judge N. Sneigerova].
70. See KONST. RF (1993) § 1,ch. 2, art. 50(l) ("No one may be repeatedly
convicted for the same offense.").
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ing in jail the entire time. 7 1 The judge claimed that this practice of
allowing the prosecution to repeatedly appeal acquittals violates the
Due Process Clause of the Russian Constitution because, based upon
international standards, the prevailing interpretation renders the
clause null and void.7 2
Russian judges have also discussed whether the failure to conduct
jury trials in all Russian regions is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Russian Constitution. The Russian Constitution states,
in pertinent part, that: "Anyone accused of having committed a crime
has the right to have the case against him heard by a court and jury as
provided by federal law."7 3 Jury trials are presently conducted in only
nine of the eighty-nine political subdivisions that comprise the Russian Federation. 74 Russian judges argue that all defendants who wish
to have their case heard before a jury should be given a jury trial, that
the opportunity for a jury trial should not depend on the mere fortuitousness of having a trial in one of the nine jury-trial regions.
With the weakened political will of the Yeltsin administration and
the failure of the Russian legislature to expand the jury trial to other
jurisdictions, it appears that reform can only come from the Russian
judiciary itself. Russian judges defying long-held beliefs and practices based upon the rule of law is a very positive development. 7 ' The
impact of these cases should not, however, be exaggerated. The Russian justice system, like most continental European systems, is codebased, and, as a result, stare decisis is not a principle of Russian jurisprudence. Therefore, these cases have little or no precedential

71. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS TRIAL OBSERVERS MISSION
TO Moscow: REPORT ON THE TRIAL OF AiU MARIAM IN THE GAGARINSKI INTrERMuNICIPAL COuRT IN Moscow (Dec. 1997). A Nigerian defendant was held in pre-

trial detention for twenty-two months before her trial was concluded. See idL at 10.
72. See Presentation of Judge N. Sneigerova, supra note 69; if: Chloe Arnold,
Russians Debate Need For the Death Penalt., MOSCOW TIFES, Mar. 12, 1998, at

4 (suggesting that the Russian Duma's recent ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights has facilitated the application of international human rights
standards in Russian courts).
73. KONST. RF (1993) § I ch. 2, art. 47(2).
74. See Hoffman, supra note 56, at A12.
75. See Apple, supra note 4, at 203.

1342

AM. U. INT'L L. REV.

[13:1327

value. 6Moreover, Russia lacks a system for reporting judicial deci7

sions.

What these decisions do reflect is a significant attitudinal change
among some members of the Russian judiciary. These judges are no
longer beholden to government power or deferential to government
practice; they are evidencing a degree of independence by applying
the law without consideration of whether the law should be tailored
to conform to government policies. This is a positive development
that if it continues and spreads to other courtrooms and judges in
Russia, is a significant indication that the rule of law is taking hold in
Russia.
G. PRE-TRIAL DETENTION IN RUSSIA

Pre-trial detention in Russia is a fundamental human rights violation. In recent years, tens of thousands of detainees and inmates have
died in Russian pre-trial detention and prison facilities.77 Conditions
in Russian prisons are deplorable; some say they are even worse than
they were under Stalin. 78 Human rights groups have strongly criticized the overcrowded and unsanitary conditions in these facilities
79
and have described incarceration in Russian jails as "torture.,
Compounding this problem is the fact that few people are released
before their trial. The use of bail is unheard of, and release before
trial is very rare. 80 The accused can be held awaiting trial for months

76. A worthwhile technical assistance project would be to help the Russian
courts build a nationwide reporting system of judicial decisions and laws. Regional
courts frequently complain that there is a significant delay in receiving new laws.
77. See 1997 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNTRY REPORTS, 1996:
RUSSIA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR

1996. "[B]etween

10,000 and 20,000 detainees and prison inmates died in penitentiary facilities
throughout Russia, some due to beatings, but most as a result of overcrowding, inferior sanitary conditions, or lack of medical care." Id.
78. See Alessandra Stanley, Russians Lament the Crime of Punishment, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1998, at Al, A6.
79. See AMNESTY INT'L, TORTURE IN RUSSIA: "THIS MAN-MADE HELL," Al
Index: EUR 46/04/97 (Apr. 1997) (describing conditions in facilities as uniformly
deplorable). Conditions, "particularly for those awaiting trial, remain appalling and
amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." Id.
80. See Todd Foglesong, Habeas Corpus or Who Has the Body? Judicial Review of Arrest and PretrialDetention in Russia, 14 WIS. INT'L L.J. 541, 544-46
(1996).
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or even years. 8 1 The vast majority of Russian judges recognize that
something must be done to improve the over-crowded and lamentable conditions of Russian jails.
One step that should be taken to remedy the situation is the institution of an effective system of bail. 82 Adding to the overcrowding
problem is the lack of a system for guilty pleas and plea-bargaining.
Defendants who have confessed to a crime can wait months before
they are tried, and because there is no system for making pleas, every
case must be tried. This burdens the Russian courts with trials that
are simply unnecessary.
In Moscow, the city court has recently requested that the Russian
Parliament enact legislation that would enable it to experiment with a
system of plea-bargaining. This could be a very positive step. Many
in the United States claim that if plea-bargaining were not available,
the United States criminal justice system would collapse. Despite this
sentiment, plea-bargaining is generally not a highly regarded process
in the United States. Nevertheless, Russia is considering the use of
such a system. Russians, legal professionals, and lay people are all
suspicious of any system in which "confessions" are the basis for imprisonment. Soviet history is the obvious reason for this suspicion
and distrust. Russian judges recognize, however, that the) need to
improve the situation in pre-trial detention facilities. The timely
resolution of cases where guilt is not disputed may be part of a solution.

V. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
The past year could lead one toward cautious optimism on the
likelihood of the development of an independent judiciary in Russia.
As discussed above, progress has been made in judicial reform.
However, opposition to judicial reform still exists and will continue
as long as the legislature is controlled by Communists, former Communists, and re-labeled Communists. The question of whether judicial reforms in Russia will continue is ultimately a political one. The
introduction of the jury trial, one of the major reforms, is staled de81. See INTERNATIONAL COMM'N OF JURISTS. TRIA OBSI-RVERS NISSION TO
Moscow, REPORT ON THE TRIAL OF AJU MARIAM IN THi G.;.kRINSKI I.T-R
MuNICIPAL COURT IN Moscow (Dec. 1997).

82. See Foglesong, supra note 80, at 554-48.
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spite the fact that the right to a jury trial is a right enumerated in the
Russian Constitution. This right is contingent, in effect, on the passage of implementing legislation that the Duma presently does not
appear willing to enact. If Western governments, interested Russian
citizens, and legal practitioners do not steadfastly encourage the introduction of the jury trial to all of Russia, it may never happen even
though the right to jury trial was included in the new Russian Constitution that was adopted in 1993. This casual jettisoning of a recently adopted constitutional right does not bode well for the construction of a rule-of-law society in Russia.
The path of judicial reform that has been followed this past year
should continue and its scope should expand. More judges should be
appointed to the bench for life. The Russian lower courts should administer their own budgets just as the Supreme Court of Russia does.
Russian judges, rather than the Ministry of Justice, should train other
judges and should be responsive to judges' needs.
The budget for the Russian courts must be increased and facilities
must be improved so that the Russian population at large realizes that
the courts of justice are important and deserving of their respect. This
is central to the construction of a rule-of-law state.
Finally, there needs to be an attitudinal change in the elected leadership of Russia. The Russian judiciary must be considered an equal
branch of government. Elected representatives must respect the rulings of Russian courts, and the Russian Constitution must be viewed
as the supreme law of the land, not the structure or means to achieve
power. Unfortunately, centuries of authoritarian history and culture
are working against these developments.

